This work explores the role of new media in Russian politics and ultimately argues that their potential to bring about significant political change in the current Russian political landscape is limited. The 2011 winter protests, in Bolotnaia Square in Moscow and across Russia, led to a boom in both Russian and English-language protest scholarship, especially regarding the role that new media and online communication networks play in the organisation and execution of political movements. But the significance of this case study is not limited to Russia: this question must be understood in a global context.
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of Putin's rule, pro-government media have become increasingly dominant in Russia and there has been a consequent marginalisation of opposition narratives from mainstream media discourse.
This has meant that the online sphere not only 'appears to be a key element of modern protest in many ways, defined by its unprecedented nature and organisational potential', 1 but also appears to be the only realistic medium for the opposition to carry out anti-government political activity. 2 In this essay, the highly important 2011-2012 winter protests will be used as a case study and as a springboard for wider discussion of the characteristics, strengths and flaws of online political communication in Russia. Additionally, examination and evaluation of the advantages and limitations of online communication platforms
1 Aleksandra Van'ke, Irina Ksenofontova and Irina Tartakovskaia, 'Internet-kommunikatsii kak sredstvo i uslovie politicheskoi mobilizatsii v Rossii (na primere dvizheniia "za chestnye vybory")', (hereafter, 'Internet-kommunikatsii kak sredstvo i uslovie politicheskoi mobilizatsii'), INTER, 7, 2014, pp. 44-73 (p. 44) . 2 Nicole Bode and Andrey Makarychev, 'The New Social Media in Russia: Political Blogging by the Government and the Opposition' (hereafter, 'The New Social Media in Russia'), Problems of Post-Communism, 60(2), 2013, pp. 53-62 (p. 54) .
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themselves as political tools is crucial. By combining these approaches, this work aims to suggest an answer to the question of whether online activism has the potential to effect large-scale political change in Russia and then to provide strategic recommendations for future action.
CASE STUDY
Between December 2011 and May 2012 dissatisfied Russian citizens took part in the largest public demonstrations since the El'tsin era on the streets of Moscow and in other cities across Russia. 3 In late 2011, evidence of election fraud benefitting the ruling party, United Russia, was spread across online platforms. This, in turn, inspired the 'Za Chestnye Vybory' (For Fair Elections) movement, which 'not only provoked a widespread protest movement, but also problematised the question about ideological unity within Russian society '. 4 It is important to recognise that the 2011-2012 protests cannot and should not be classified as successful in the conventional sense. Firstly, the fraudulent election proceedings were in no way affected by the mass mobilizations; 5 secondly, trust in Putin only increased between January and March 2012 6 . More importantly, the large and unexpected mobilisations were made possible through the power of the online sphere, and the consequent offline political action then came to the attention of the ruling government. As a direct result of this, the sphere in which the opposition in Russia operates has changed significantly: since 2012, 'systematic Internet regulation has increased in Russia more than anywhere else in the world', 7 and
Putin's government has 'approved a series of repressive, vaguely worded measures that significantly expand the array of regulatory tools available'.
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The real success and significance of the 2011-2012 mobilisations has been in establishing the use of the internet as a tool to politicise the public and mobilise Russian civil society, particularly around the issue Legislation that has come into force since the 2011-2012 protests, such as the law that any blogger with over 3,000 unique daily visitors to their page must register as a media outlet with Roskomnadzor and is subject to the same regulation as any mass media channel, 18 is further evidence of the government's awareness of the political power of online narratives and of social networks' 'subversive potential', especially during 'periods of political tension '. 19 To further understand the political power struggle that is taking place in the online sphere in Russia, and to examine the potential of online narratives to achieve mainstream attention, it is useful to look at how this conflict played out in the context of the 2011-2012 protests.
During this period, Russian bloggers and online activists brought the trigger issue of electoral fraud to the forefront of online discussion and incited unprecedented engagement and mobilisation around this issue. This was achieved not only without the help of the mainstream media, but also while leading opposition activists, such as Alexey Navalny, were blacklisted from the sphere. 20 These facts suggest that if opposition narratives had been granted exposure in the government-friendly mainstream media, the movement would have been much larger.
However, 'for the first time in post-Soviet history, the Kremlin's ability to control the news agenda was significantly challenged by not only the scale of the protests, but the way in which the internet was able to disseminate news and evidence of the breadth of activity'. 21 By analysing the coverage of various media outlets over the months of the protests, Oates and Lokot find that 'the state-run news was forced to adjust its frame so as to come close enough to reality to be feasible for the viewer'. 27 The protests, and the online information networks surrounding them, had grown to such a size that mainstream media channels could no longer ignore or discount them: discourse around the protests 'welled up from the internet to the state-run news even in a controlled media system'.
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Unsurprisingly, the limited number of independent news outlets that continue to exist in Russia were heavily involved from the very beginning and complemented the work of oppositional internet users. Context & Media, 6, 2014, pp. 11-21 (p. 12) .
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However, although 'visual irony is one of the important indicators of how a country's current situation is being perceived by its people', it should be understood that 'ironical actions are of a passive nature'. 58 Sanina suggests that new media can actually depoliticise audiences by 'encouraging them to confuse online rhetoric with substantial political action [and] diverting their attention away from productive activities'. 59 When writing on the use of humorous and satirical placards at the 2011-2012 protests, Ksenofontova observes that 'at a certain stage of the development of the movement a "playful" and depoliticised form of protest begins to dominate'. 60 This raises the question of whether the use of satire and humour in online political activism could actually be a depoliticising force that detracts from online opposition society members' efforts to inspire politicisation and mobilisation.
Taking this into a broader context, it is worth examining Suslov's work on the hashtag #krymnash, which first appeared on March 8-9 2014 in celebration of the signing of Crimea's accession treaty to Russia. 61 Interestingly, the linguistic structure of this hashtag, #krymnash, '[harks] back to […] late Soviet "authoritative language", 62 a revival of which can be observed as a trend in Putin-era propaganda.
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While supporters of the annexation adopted the hashtag and created variations such as #DobroPozhalovat'Domoi ('welcome home') and #SvoikhNeBrosaem ('we don't leave our own behind'), those against the annexation appropriated the hashtag #krymnash ironically. 64 This ironical interpretation of the hashtag portrays the meaning: 'I am powerless to change 58 something bad and evil that is happening in my life, but I have one bitter consolation -Crimea is ours!'. 65 The cartoon in Figure 1 , 66 which was posted on blogging platform LiveJournal, is a good example of the ironical use of #krymnash.
Suslov proposes that 'ironically, if "Crimea is ours" imagery has returned dignity, self-esteem, and the sense of historical importance to [pro-annexation] social network users, its interpretation in the geopolitical and 'civilisational' context has stolen agency, autonomy and political subjectivity from the 'grassroots'. 67 According to Suslov, users adopting the ironical meaning of the hashtag '[display] a perceived lack of agency [and] an inability to change one's own conditions or influence political decision-making'. 68 In this case, satirical opposition-minded internet users have actually suffered a loss: the community of proannexation internet users who engaged with the hashtag's intended meaning was strengthened, whereas those who satirised the slogan lost touch with the seriousness of the issue, to depoliticising effect. This is certainly not what an opposition movement should be aiming for in its activism if it is indeed striving to actively engage followers with political issues and to mobilise them.
Irony in Russian political discourse is nothing new and it 'has its own traditions, that were forms even in the era of tsarism and were strengthened through the Soviet underground movement: caricatures, the grotesque and anecdotes. 69 'Steb', 70 for example, which emerged in the late Soviet period among groups such as the Mit'ki and necrorealists, has been observed in modern Russian political discourse. 71 This form of irony is unique and is defined by Yurchak as '[requiring] such a degree of overidentification with the object, person or idea […] that it was often impossible to tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mix of the two'. 72 This definition mirrors the depoliticising lack of agency seen around the hashtag #krymnash in Suslov's study.
Such traditions of political irony are continued in twenty-first-century online communication where, importantly, the modern internet has its 'own individual arsenal of means for creating ironical materials'.
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Since the tools available on online social networking platforms now facilitate the spreading of satirical materials at an unprecedented speed and to an audience of unprecedented breadth, this depoliticising, ironic engagement with political issues is taking place on a larger scale than ever before. Therefore, the prevalent 59 trend for irony and humour in online discourse may be steadily decreasing the probability of online engagement materialising into serious offline activism in the mainstream political sphere.
Barash points out a further important characteristic of online political communication in Russia in
that 'social networks today are not only the most effective mobilisation tool, but also in many ways the only real instrument of horizontal communication in society'. 74 In the context of the 2011-2012 protest movement, though, this horizontal communication structure, common in new media communication, seems to have had negative consequences. Suvorov observes, for example, that 'There is no structure or hierarchy in the protest movement. There are "leaders" and the masses, and between the two a huge yawning gap'. 75 Furthermore, Van'ke et al., in their study of the 2011-2012 protest-orientated Facebook group 'We were at Bolotnaia and will come again', observed that 'throughout the whole existence of the group the moderators preserved their anonymity'. 76 They see this movement as one 'that has positioned itself from the very start as a "leaderless" movement, not dependent on any concrete leaders'. 77 Although prominent bloggers such as Alexey Navalny are often considered leaders of the protest movement, 78 Barash considers that there is an 'lack of any leader in various camps', which is preventing the online sphere from effecting real political change in Russia. 79 Without any solid leadership structure in the opposition, the 'make-up of the protest group is quite large in number, but altogether heterogeneous when it comes to socio-demographic indicators'. 80 In this way, the movement 'unites only those who are under the slogan "against Putin"', 81 rather than organising those with similar and more nuanced political goals and ideas to join forces and instigate significant political change. It could be argued, however, that such a 'common goal' as the fight for fair elections 'forced representatives of various ideological persuasions to come together'. 82 The emergence of decentralised and leaderless movements could in fact present a serious problem for opposition actors in Russia today. Morozov, again not writing specifically about the Russian context, suggests that such structures 'exploit all the benefits of the internet to mobilize their supporters while also believing that they won't need to become centralized, hierarchical, and competitive in the political arena'.
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As demonstrated above, the online opposition network that existed in Russia in 2011-2012 fits this description: an anti-government protest movement was broad and united in the online sphere, but showed few signs of having the potential to centralise and develop a hierarchy within itself in preparation for future offline action. According to Morozov, if a movement fails to do this, its chance of effecting change in mainstream politics is very low.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is important to remember that the 2011-2012 mobilizations brought about no systemic political change concerning the election process, and nor did they prevent United Russia, the ruling party, from benefitting from electoral fraud. As Oates and Lokot put it, 'the protests showed Russians they Analysis of the 2011-2012 protest movements in Russia has shown that online activism has the power to create large oppositional online communities, which are steadily growing as internet penetration levels in Russia continue to increase. Furthermore, social networking platforms themselves have been proved to be a medium providing effective tools for creating such communities and spreading information within them. Whether this means that activism efforts online can or will amount to any large-scale political change in Russia, however, is a different question, and one that is more concerned with the characteristics of political internet use, the methods used by online opposition activists, and the organisation of opposition voices in the online sphere.
In this way, it can be argued that it is opposition-minded activists and internet users themselves who are curbing the potential of online activism to effect large-scale political change. 
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as a political tool, the next step forward in online opposition activism in Russia will be defined by the extent to which activists and internet users are able to overcome these obstacles.
This in turn raises questions of whether online engagement would remain so high if the highly shareable humourous elements of online communication were to be reduced, and whether enough Russians are actually prepared to convert online views into offline action in a society that is becoming increasingly hostile towards those who openly oppose the government. Finally, since the group of Russians opposing Putin is so heterogeneous, would the division of this large group into more hierarchical and interest-specific structures leave any one group that would have the potential to make any significant difference in the mainstream political arena?
The 2011-2012 Moscow protests and continuing efforts of activists represent 'a step in the evolution of Russian citizens from relatively passive to relatively active in their civil society', which, in theory, could reach a critical mass at some point. 88 However, by understanding the characteristics of online communication in Russia as well as the political climate in which the Russian opposition is forced to operate, it seems that 'no one should hold their breath for a wave of revolutionary action to pour out of the internet onto the streets in Russia'.
89 88 Oates and Lokot, 'Twilight of the Gods?', p. 17. 89 Barash, 'Internet kak sredstvo samoaktualizatsii i revoliutsionnoi samoorganizatsii', p. 108.
